

# China and the Global Diffusion of Solar Energy

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
# Motivation

# Growing need for clean energy

- Around 73% of global greenhouse gas emissions are attributed to the energy sector
- Many emissions cuts rely on further electrification
- Many people around the world do not yet have access to electricity. Emissions will grow if this energy is produced in a carbon-intensive way
- **Clean energy is the critical factor in determining emission reductions**
- **But where does all this clean energy come from?**

# Cost of solar has fallen dramatically

**Figure:** Global average price of solar PV modules (in 2019 US\$ per Watt)




Source: LaFond et al. (2017) & IRENA Database



# Renewable electricity capacity, especially solar, has grown rapidly


Figure: World electricity production by source



Source: International Energy Agency (IEA)

# But solar is still a small share of global electricity generation


Figure: World Electricity Generation by Source



Source: Our World in Data based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy & Ember (2022)


# Adoption of solar is heterogeneous across countries

**Figure:** Cumulative installed solar capacity up to 2021(GW)



**Source:** Our World in Data, based on Statistical Review of World Energy - BP (2022)

# Current use of solar uncorrelated with solar power potential



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy and Global Solar Atlas (2020)

# How does industrial policy in China affect global solar adoption?

Global rise of solar has coincided with massive expansion of solar industry in China

Three steps to answering this question

- 1 Did Chinese industrial policy increase solar innovation, production and exports?
- 2 Did Chinese industrial policy increase global solar innovation and decrease global solar prices?
- 3 What are the barriers to global solar adoption?

# How does industrial policy in China affect global solar adoption?

Global rise of solar has coincided with massive expansion of solar industry in China

Three steps to answering this question


- ① **Did Chinese industrial policy increase solar innovation, production and exports?**
- ② Did Chinese industrial policy increase global solar innovation and decrease global solar prices?
- ③ What are the barriers to global solar adoption?

# Project 1 Overview: Industrial Policy and Solar Innovation in China

- Autonomous local governments in China implemented **heterogeneous support for the solar industry**, particularly subsidies for **production and innovation** starting around 2007
- **Synthetic diff-in-diff** approach to exploit cross-sectional variation in treatment + timing
  - Control is never treated cities
  - Synthetic approach to improve plausibility of our control
- Estimate using **novel data** on solar industry in China and solar industrial policy
  - Firm level data on production, capacity, patents, exports from **ENF + SIPO + PATSTAT + Chinese customs data + Orbis + Chinese firm registration data**
  - Policy level data from **PKU Law** classified into policy type using NLP

# Patent distribution at city level and policy implementation

2000




**Note:** black circled cities are treated by any subsidy policy



# Patent distribution at city level and policy implementation


2001



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
2002



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
2003



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
2004



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
2005



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
2006



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
2007



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2008




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
2009



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
2010



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
2011



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
2012



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
2013



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
2014



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
2015



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2016




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
2017



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
2018



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

2019



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# Results: Subsidies increase innovation

**Figure:** Patents (2007 Cohort)



**Notes:** SDID estimates on 358 cities, 3 that introduced policy in 2007. Outcome: IHS of patents by solar firms in a city-year. SE cluster bootstrapped by city.

# Results: Subsidies increase innovation


**Table:** Patents (Aggregate ATT)

	<i>Any subsidy</i>	<i>Demand subsidy</i>	<i>Production subsidy</i>	<i>Innovation subsidy</i>
All patents	0.496** (0.200)	0.236 (0.275)	0.871*** (0.227)	1.060*** (0.367)
Observations	6,086	6,086	6,086	6,086

**Notes:** \* 0.1 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01. SDID on 358 cities 2004-2020. Outcome is IHS of patents by solar firms in a city-year pair (av. = 13.1). SE cluster bootstrapped by city.

# Results: Subsidies increase production

**Figure:** Panel Production Capacity (2007 Cohort)



**Notes:** SDID estimates on 358 cities, focusing on the 3 that introduced a policy in 2007. Outcome is IHS of Solar Panel production capacity in a city-year pair.

# Results: Subsidies increase production



**Table:** Solar Panel Production Capacity (Aggregate ATT)

	<i>Any subsidy</i>	<i>Demand subsidy</i>	<i>Production subsidy</i>	<i>Innovation subsidy</i>
Panel production	2.098*** (0.532)	0.587 (0.467)	2.496*** (0.575)	2.930*** (0.773)
Observations	3,580	3,580	3,580	3,580

**Notes:** \* 0.1 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01. SDID estimates on 358 cities 2004-2019. Outcome is IHS of production capacity of solar firms in a city-year pair.

# Results: Subsidies increase exports

**Figure:** Export Value (2007 Cohort)



**Notes:** SDID estimates on 358 cities, focusing on the 3 that introduced a policy in 2007. Outcome is IHS of export value of Solar firms in a city-year pair.



# Results: Subsidies increase exports


**Table:** Exports (Aggregate ATT)

	<i>Any subsidy</i>	<i>Demand subsidy</i>	<i>Production subsidy</i>	<i>Innovation subsidy</i>
Export value	0.658** (0.263)	0.095 (0.182)	0.941*** (0.363)	1.404** (0.570)
Export volume	2.111** (0.999)	0.090 (0.774)	2.875** (1.287)	3.826* (1.984)
Solar export value	0.964*** (0.359)	0.311 (0.273)	1.311*** (0.477)	1.917*** (0.607)
Solar export volume	3.984*** (1.133)	0.980 (0.688)	5.289*** (1.502)	7.501*** (1.953)

**Notes:** \* 0.1 \*\* 0.05 \*\*\* 0.01. Solar exports classified via HS8. SDID on 358 cities 2004-2016. Outcome is IHS.

# China's rise in solar shipments

Figure: Solar PV module shipments (GW) by country of origin, 2010-2019



Source: International Energy Agency (IEA)

# How does industrial policy in China affect global solar adoption?

Global rise of solar has coincided with massive expansion of solar industry in China

Three steps to answering this question

- 1 Did Chinese industrial policy increase solar innovation, production and exports?
- 2 **Did Chinese industrial policy increase global solar innovation and decrease global solar prices?**
- 3 What are the barriers to global solar adoption?

# Chinese industrial policy and global innovation

There are a few steps between Chinese industrial policy and a global price decline...

- **Policy spillovers:**

- What are the geopolitics of solar industrial policy?
- Did Chinese industrial policy crowd out policy efforts elsewhere? or the opposite?
- How does it depend on the distance to the technological frontier?
- An inverted-U relationship (as for competition and innovation)?

- **Innovation spillovers:**

- Holding policy constant, how does Chinese innovation diffuse across the globe?
- Does it stimulate innovation elsewhere?
- An inverted-U relationship?

- Global net innovation → global price decline?

# How does industrial policy in China affect global solar adoption?

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Three steps to answering this question

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# Cost declines may not translate into immediate uptake

- **Long-run adoption** driven by:
  - relative costs, solar potential, timing/intermittency, contracting frictions, discount rate
  - See Arkolakis and Walsh (2023) for global model ft. some of these factors
- **Pathway to long-run equilibrium** depends on
  - Political economy: fossil fuel resources, energy independence, lobbying, state ownership of
  - Policy: 'pro-environment' attitudes and subsidy policies
  - Lock-in: sunk costs (power plants, transmission lines) and depreciation rate
  - Strategic delay: anticipation of future price declines
  - Market structure and incentives: long-term contracts, public vs. private
  - Growth rate of energy demand
- **Transition path matters** for meeting climate goals
  - 10 years of 'status quo' emissions left before we severely limit chances of sticking to 1.5
  - **This paper** → what are the biggest barriers to renewables adoption and how do these vary across countries?

# Simple model: many countries, representative consumer

- Many countries, no trade (for now) in goods, services, electricity
- Representative consumer in country  $j$  obtains utility from electricity services
- Electricity services in country  $j$  are a CES of output of two energy sectors - solar and non-solar

$$e_j = \left( \kappa_{j,s'} e_{j,s'}^\rho + \kappa_{j,s} e_{j,s}^\rho \right)^{1/\rho} \quad (1)$$

- Where:
  - $e_j$  is total electricity services in country  $j$
  - $e_{j,s}$  and  $e_{j,s'}$  are output of the solar and non-solar sector
  - $\rho$  governs substitutability between solar and non-solar (captures intermittency / flexibility)
  - $\kappa_{j,\text{sector}}$  reflects productivity differences in energy sources across countries

## Simple model 2: power plants

- Electricity output is the combined output of many power plants.
  - Each power plant is operated by a single firm, and each firm operates at most one power plant.
  - For now, each power plant is of a fixed capacity, e.g. 1MW.
  - Continuum of potential entrant firms in each sector (solar, dirty)
- In period  $t$ , a potential entrant pays
  - fixed cost to learn productivity
  - fixed cost to build a power plant after learning productivity (innovation shifts distribution over time)
  - does not operate in first period ( $\rightarrow$  lead times)
- An incumbent plant (which was built prior to period  $t$ )
  - Faces an exogenous probability of shut-down
  - Experiences idiosyncratic shock to their productivity
  - Pays variable costs of operation (varies by sector  $\rightarrow$  input costs)
  - Cannot change its capacity
  - Can choose to exit and receive some portion of the initial build cost back



# Simple model 3: Electricity markets and government

- Simple, decentralised electricity market
  - Need to be parsimonious and flexible if building a globally applicable model
  - Aim to capture (i) alternative market structures (ii) grid balancing considerations in a reduced form way
- Government can
  - tax/subsidise set up costs
  - tax/subsidise operational costs
  - tax/subsidise shut-down costs
  - tax/subsidise output prices
- These can be levied at the
  - sector level (e.g. policies to support renewables)
  - firm level (e.g. preferential treatment of state-owned firms, long-term contracts etc)

# Using the model

- Theoretical predictions about impact of cost changes on composition of the electricity grid
- Structural estimation to rationalise cross-country differences in adoption rates
- Policy counterfactual analysis, e.g. subsidise to coal shut down (reduce form version of Germany's reverse coal auctions)

# Prediction example: decline in solar costs

- A decline in the cost of solar panels will
  - increase entry of solar firms
  - push down electricity prices
  - increase exit of incumbent fossil firms only if post-tax running costs  $>$  post-tax electricity price
- In long-run equilibrium quantity of solar will increase, but will not move there immediately
  - Speed of adjustment depends on (i) depreciation rate/shutdown probability (ii) energy demand growth

# Data

- **Upfront and operational costs by sector**
  - IEA projected costs of generating electricity
  - IRENA renewable power generation costs
  - Potentially hard to get country-specific data
- **Consumer electricity prices:** OECD Energy Prices and Taxes quarterly (patchy availability)
- **Power plants:** Plant level data from World Resources Institute/Global Energy Monitor
- **Renewable potential:** Global Solar/Wind Atlas
- **Global Energy Policies**
  - Multiple supposedly 'global' datasets exist → cross-reference and combine...
  - All Energy Sector Policies: (i) OECD Policy Instruments for the Environment (PINE) Database (ii) Climate Policy Database (iii) IEA policy database
  - Subsidies: IRENA, OECD/IISD Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker, OECD Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels, IEA Energy subsidies database, IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies database
- **Environmental attitudes:** World Values Survey

# Data: still looking for...

- Suggestions for additional sources for any of the above
- Construction times (to estimate lead times)
- Timing of electricity demand by country (to estimate intermittency index)
- Fossil fuel reserves
- Share of government revenues from fossil fuels